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Startup Deep Dive : Auxilo Finserve — the unsecured education lender with a Rs 4,875 crore book and 0.08% bad loans

The Invincible India Startup Deep Dive featured graphic for Auxilo Finserve.

On 25 March 2020, the day India’s economy shut its doors for the pandemic, ICICI Bank signed the papers to buy a stake in a little-known education lender called Auxilo Finserve. Five and a half years later, that non-banking finance company’s loan book stood at ₹4,875.60 crore ($508 million) as of 30 September 2025, built almost entirely on loans with no collateral, handed to teenagers and their families betting on a degree overseas.

Here is the contradiction worth sitting with: a lender that bets on unsecured debt to fund strangers’ foreign degrees reports a net non-performing asset ratio of just 0.08% as of September 2025, on a book where barely one loan in ten carries any security at all. How a company this size gets away with that, and what happens if it stops, is the rest of this piece.

Quick facts

Company Auxilo Finserve Private Limited (incorporated as Stellenyak General Finance Private Limited)
Founded Incorporated 4 October 2016; RBI non-deposit NBFC licence granted 3 May 2017; lending began October 2017
Promoters / CEO Akash Bhanshali (via ELME Advisors LLP) and Balrampur Chini Mills Limited (BCML), 29.99% each as of September 2025; MD and CEO Neeraj Saxena, previously CEO of rival education NBFC Avanse
Businesses Overseas and domestic higher-education loans to students, working-capital and infrastructure loans to education institutions, skill-development loans
Latest FY revenue ₹528 crore in FY25, up 48.3% year-on-year (Entrackr, September 2025); total income ₹543.64 crore per audited accounts (CARE Ratings, November 2025)
Latest FY profit ₹111.94 crore net profit in FY25, up from ₹69.22 crore in FY24 (CARE Ratings, November 2025)
Listed Private; equity is unlisted, but its non-convertible debentures and commercial paper are rated and traded
Market value / last valuation Not publicly disclosed. Raised ₹470 crore in FY24 and roughly ₹300 crore in FY25 in primary equity from external investors (CARE Ratings, November 2025)
Key shareholders Akash Bhanshali and Balrampur Chini Mills (29.99% each), ICICI Bank, Tata Capital Growth Fund II, Trifecta Leaders Fund I, Xponentia Opportunities Fund II, Jade Inclusion Limited (LeapFrog Investments)

What they do

Auxilo Finserve is a Mumbai-headquartered, RBI-registered non-banking finance company that lends money for education rather than taking deposits. Its core product is the unsecured loan a middle-class Indian family takes out to send a child to a master’s programme in the United States, Britain or Canada, an amount that can run to ₹2 crore and that most public-sector banks will not touch without property as security. Alongside that, Auxilo lends working capital and infrastructure money to schools and colleges, and, since 2022, funds shorter vocational and skilling courses through a tie-up with the National Skill Development Corporation. As per CARE Ratings’ November 2025 assessment, higher-education loans to individual students make up 96.41% of its ₹4,875.60 crore loan book as of 30 September 2025, with institution loans and skill loans filling the rest.

The origin

The insight behind Auxilo was not a piece of technology; it was a gap in India’s banking rulebook. Under the industry’s own IBA model education loan scheme, a bank can lend up to ₹7.5 lakh against no collateral at all, backed by a government credit guarantee. Push past that threshold, which almost every serious overseas master’s programme does within its first semester’s tuition, and the borrower is generally asked for property, fixed deposits or other tangible security. For a family without a spare flat to mortgage, that rule alone can decide whether a child studies abroad at all.

Akash Bhanshali, a chartered accountant who runs the principal investments arm of Enam Holdings, and Balrampur Chini Mills Limited, India’s second-largest integrated sugar manufacturer, saw the same gap that had already built a market for rival lender Avanse: underwrite the student’s future earning power, not the family’s real estate. They incorporated the vehicle as Stellenyak General Finance Private Limited on 4 October 2016, secured its NBFC licence from the Reserve Bank of India on 3 May 2017, rebranded it as Auxilo, and put an outsider in charge of running it: Neeraj Saxena, who had already built Avanse’s education-lending book and had prior stints at DHFL, Trent and EY. The company began disbursing loans in October 2017, with FY19 as its first full year of operations, according to CARE Ratings’ company history.

The struggle years

Auxilo’s first real test arrived within three years of launch, and it came from outside India entirely. When the pandemic shut national borders in 2020, the entire premise of the company’s book, students physically travelling abroad to study, stopped making sense overnight. The numbers from that period, as filed with CARE Ratings, are unsentimental: Auxilo’s net interest margin fell from 7.97% in FY20 to 6.52% in FY21, as disbursements slowed and the processing fees that ride along with them dried up. Return on total assets, already thin at 0.68% in FY20, only recovered to 1.49% in FY21, still a fraction of what a mature NBFC would post.

The institution-lending side of the book, loans to the schools and colleges themselves, took the harder hit. Campuses shut, fee collections stalled, and Auxilo had to restructure ₹17.73 crore of loans under the Reserve Bank’s two COVID resolution frameworks, of which ₹16.97 crore, or 2.68% of its entire assets under management, was still outstanding as of 30 September 2021. The company additionally extended around ₹18 crore under the government’s Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme to keep stressed institutional borrowers afloat. Growth nearly stalled with them: assets under management moved from ₹470 crore as of 31 March 2020 to just ₹632 crore by 30 September 2021, a year and a half of near-flat scale for a company that needed growth to justify its cost base.

What kept the company solvent through this stretch was not the lending book, it was the promoters’ willingness to keep writing cheques. Bhanshali and BCML had already put in ₹315 crore of equity capital between 2017 and September 2021, according to CARE Ratings, giving Auxilo a gearing ratio of just 0.87x and a capital adequacy ratio above 51% at a moment when a leaner NBFC would have been forced to shrink its book or raise expensive emergency debt.

The turning point

The single event that set up Auxilo’s next five years happened in the same week the country locked down. On 25 March 2020, ICICI Bank signed definitive agreements to subscribe to 3,40,62,153 equity shares in Auxilo Finserve for ₹51.09 crore, buying a 9.8-9.9% stake and diluting Balrampur Chini Mills from a 50% holding to 45.05%, as reported by Business Standard and confirmed in CARE Ratings’ subsequent filings. It was, on its face, an odd moment for India’s largest private bank to back a three-year-old lender whose entire business depended on students crossing borders that had just closed.

The bet paid off once travel resumed. On one side of that ledger sits the company ICICI backed: AUM of ₹470 crore, a NIM sliding toward 6.5%, and a rating agency openly worried about a single-asset-class NBFC with an unseasoned book. On the other side, five and a half years later, sits AUM of ₹4,875.60 crore as of 30 September 2025, a compounded annual growth rate of roughly 78% in the three years to FY25, and a CARE long-term rating that had climbed from CARE A- in early 2020 to CARE A+ by late 2025. ICICI Bank’s continued presence as a shareholder also gave Auxilo something more valuable than capital: a signal to other private banks that it was safe to lend to, which shows up later in how the company funds itself.

The money behind it

Auxilo has never run a conventional venture-funding playbook of headline valuations and marquee term sheets. Its capital has come in structured tranches from a mix of strategic promoters, a large private bank and specialist private-equity funds, most of it un-trumpeted until rating agencies disclosed the numbers.

The effect of two funding rounds in quick succession was a sharp change in ownership. Bhanshali and BCML’s combined fully diluted stake fell from 87.80% as of March 2023 to 59.98% by 31 August 2024, and has held near there since, per CARE Ratings. A latest-round valuation has not been disclosed by the company or reported by any source this piece could verify, so it is left out here rather than estimated. What is on record is the credit market’s verdict on the balance sheet those rounds built: CARE Ratings and CRISIL both carry Auxilo at A+/Stable on its long-term debt and A1+ on its commercial paper, CRISIL having upgraded the company from A/Positive as recently as 30 March 2024.

How it makes money

Strip away the education branding and Auxilo runs the oldest business in finance: borrow at one rate, lend at a higher one, and try to keep what slips through the cracks to a minimum. Nearly all its revenue is interest income and loan processing fees, and nearly all its costs are the interest it pays on its own borrowings.

This is the part people tend to get wrong about a business like Auxilo’s: a headline EBITDA margin near 80% looks like a software company’s economics, but it is not the real profit line. Most of that EBITDA is committed to servicing the debt Auxilo itself borrowed to fund its loan book, which is why the return that actually belongs to shareholders, ROTA, sits closer to 2.5%, in line with any well-run specialist NBFC and nowhere near the glamour the margin figure implies. The second surprise is on asset quality: only 9.81% of Auxilo’s loans are secured as of September 2025, yet gross non-performing assets sit at 0.55% and net NPAs at 0.08%, a result CARE Ratings attributes largely to a mandatory co-borrower requirement, where an earning family member is jointly liable on nearly every loan.

The numbers

Figures below are standalone financials as reported to and cited by CARE Ratings and Entrackr from Auxilo’s Registrar of Companies filings, in ₹ crore.

Fiscal year Revenue Net profit (PAT) Assets under management
FY23 ₹174 crore ₹25.7 crore ₹1,691 crore
FY24 ₹356.68 crore ₹69.22 crore ₹2,942.10 crore
FY25 ₹528 crore (₹543.64 crore total income) ₹111.94 crore ₹4,338.71 crore
H1 FY26 (to 30 Sep 2025, unaudited) ₹345.24 crore total income ₹61.79 crore ₹4,875.60 crore

Where the money comes from

Auxilo’s book is deliberately narrow by course type and dangerously narrow, in a rating agency’s eyes, by geography. As of 30 September 2025:

The surprise in that split is how concentrated the borrower base already is around three Western economies whose visa and immigration policy has grown less predictable, not more, since 2020. A company that spent its early years fighting to prove overseas study was a viable asset class has now built a book where nearly half of everything it has lent rides on the continued attractiveness of a single country, the United States, as a study destination.

The risks

The takeaway

The lesson in Auxilo’s numbers is not really about education finance. It is about what a company can get away with when it removes one form of risk by deliberately taking on another. Every mainstream lender treated overseas education loans as fundamentally uninsurable without property as security; Auxilo built its entire model on betting that a mandatory co-borrower and a genuinely difficult underwriting process, evaluating the university, the course and the country’s job market rather than the family’s assets, could do the same job that collateral does for a bank. For five years, on a book that has barely been tested by a full economic cycle, that bet has held. The company’s own credit rating history says the same thing in a duller register: agencies do not raise a rating from A- to A+ because a story sounds good, they raise it because the numbers behind an unconventional model kept clearing the bar, year after year, in a business where almost everyone else insisted the model could not work without collateral.

Frequently asked questions

What does Auxilo Finserve do?

Auxilo Finserve is an RBI-registered, education-focused non-banking finance company that lends to individual students for higher education in India and abroad, mostly without collateral, and separately lends working-capital and infrastructure finance to schools, colleges and vocational training institutes.

Who owns Auxilo Finserve?

Auxilo is privately held. Its two founding promoters, Akash Bhanshali (through ELME Advisors LLP) and Balrampur Chini Mills Limited, each hold 29.99% on a fully diluted basis as of September 2025. The remainder is held by ICICI Bank and private-equity investors including Tata Capital Growth Fund II, Trifecta Leaders Fund I, Xponentia Opportunities Fund II and Jade Inclusion Limited, an entity of LeapFrog Investments (CARE Ratings, November 2025).

Is Auxilo Finserve profitable?

Yes. Auxilo reported a net profit of ₹111.94 crore in FY25, up from ₹69.22 crore in FY24 and ₹25.7 crore in FY23, on revenue that grew from ₹174 crore to ₹528 crore over the same period (CARE Ratings, November 2025; Entrackr, September 2025).

How much has Auxilo Finserve raised, and what is it worth?

Its promoters have put in roughly ₹350 crore since 2017. External investors added ₹51.09 crore from ICICI Bank in FY20, ₹470 crore in a July 2023 round led by Tata Capital Growth Fund II, and close to ₹300 crore more in FY25 from Jade Inclusion Limited, Trifecta and Xponentia. No post-money valuation from these rounds has been publicly disclosed (CARE Ratings, November 2025; PR Newswire, July 2023).

Is Auxilo Finserve listed on a stock exchange?

No. Its equity is privately held and unlisted. Its non-convertible debentures and commercial paper are rated by CARE Ratings (A+/Stable and A1+ respectively, as of November 2025) and CRISIL (A+/Stable, upgraded from A/Positive on 30 March 2024), and trade in the debt market.

Sources

Figures are as of September 2026. Currency converted at $1 ≈ ₹96.0 as of 18 September 2026 (Trading Economics).

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