HungerBox moves close to ₹885.9 crore ($92.3 million at $1 ≈ ₹96.0 as of 18 September 2026, Trading Economics) of workplace meals a year, yet in April 2020 it was selling almost nothing at all. The company that today runs the food courts inside seven of India’s ten biggest IT firms watched its daily orders fall from a February 2020 peak of 6.1 lakh to near-zero within eight weeks, because its entire business sat inside office buildings that a national lockdown emptied overnight.
What makes HungerBox worth studying is not that it collapsed — a company whose product is the office canteen was always going to break when the offices closed — but how long the climb back took and how it eventually paid off. Its revenue in the year to March 2020 was about ₹48 crore; three years later, in FY23, it was still only ₹41.9 crore, below the pre-pandemic mark. It was FY24 before the top line cleared that old high and the company posted its first clearly reported annual profit, and FY25 before revenue reached ₹82 crore. This is the story of a B2B food-tech firm that survived by owning almost no assets, nearly died when the one place it operated shut down, and came back as a smaller, more disciplined, profitable business.
Quick facts
| Company | HungerBox (legal entity Eatgood Technologies Private Limited, CIN U74900KA2015PTC080961, RoC Bangalore) |
| Founded | Entity incorporated 2015; brand launched August 2016 (MCA/ZaubaCorp; Forbes India) |
| Founders | Sandipan Mitra (CEO) and Uttam Kumar |
| Businesses | Full-stack B2B institutional food-tech: digital cafeteria management for corporates, campuses and institutions (ordering app, vendor operations software, food-safety and analytics) |
| Latest FY revenue | ₹82 crore operating revenue in FY25, up 26% from ₹65 crore in FY24 (Entrackr, MCA-sourced) |
| Latest FY profit | EBITDA of ₹9.2 crore in FY25 (up 47% YoY); PAT of ₹4.3 crore in FY24 (Entrackr; Inc42) |
| Listed | Private; management has flagged possible capital-market participation in 12–18 months (Entrackr, 2025) |
| Funding / valuation | About $32–35 million raised across 9–10 rounds; latest valuation not publicly disclosed (Entrackr; Tracxn) |
| Key shareholders | Paytm (One97 Communications), Sabre Partners, Neoplux, LionRock Capital, Kris Gopalakrishnan; founders held about 17% in FY25 |
What they do
HungerBox digitises the corporate cafeteria. When an employee at a large office scans a QR code, orders on the HungerBox app and skips the cash queue, that is HungerBox; when the facilities team wants a dashboard of what was eaten, wasted and paid for, that is also HungerBox. It is a business-to-business platform, not a consumer brand: the customers are employers and institutions, and the users are their staff, students or patients.
- For the employer: a managed cafeteria — vendor selection, menu, food-safety audits, subsidy management and spend analytics — run as an outsourced service.
- For the employee: an app and QR/kiosk ordering layer that removes queues and cash, with pre-ordering and digital payments.
- For the food vendor: point-of-sale, inventory and order-management software plus a captive, high-frequency customer base inside the building.
- Scale as reported (2025): more than 500 cafeterias and food courts digitised, roughly 176 clients including seven of India’s top 10 IT firms, across about 23 cities, having served over 180 million meals to date (Tracxn; company statements).
The origin
Sandipan Mitra had already built and sold one food-tech company before HungerBox existed. In the late 2000s he co-founded an early online food-ordering portal in Bangalore that was folded into JustEat’s India business and, later, into Foodpanda’s; Mitra himself spent a stint as a director at Foodpanda in India. That is an unusually specific kind of experience to carry into a second venture: he had watched consumer food delivery from the inside and concluded that its economics — expensive customer acquisition, thin loyalty, brutal discounting — were not where he wanted to build again.
The insight behind HungerBox, launched with co-founder Uttam Kumar in August 2016, was that the office cafeteria was a better place to sell food technology than the open consumer market. The demand was captive and predictable: the same thousands of people, in the same building, hungry at the same hour, every working day. Nobody had to be acquired with a coupon. What was missing was the software layer — ordering, payments, vendor management, hygiene compliance and data — that turned a chaotic subsidised canteen into a measurable operation. HungerBox chose to be asset-light: it would not own kitchens or employ chefs, but would aggregate existing food vendors and sell the technology and management wrapper around them. That decision, more than any other, is what let the company survive what came next.
The struggle years
HungerBox has one dominant near-death experience, and it is worth telling without softening.
By February 2020 the company was on its best run yet. It was processing about 6.1 lakh orders a day, had roughly 158 corporate accounts across 18 cities, was closing in on EBITDA break-even, and was talking openly about crossing a million orders a day by that August. Its revenue for the year to March 2020 was about ₹48 crore, up from roughly ₹9.6 crore two years earlier. Then India locked down. Because HungerBox lived entirely inside offices, and offices shut, the collapse was immediate and total in a way few businesses ever face:
- March 2020: daily orders roughly halved as offices began emptying.
- April 2020: orders fell to almost nil — the cafeterias simply were not open.
- October 2020: volumes had recovered only to about 25% of pre-COVID levels, roughly 1.5 lakh orders a day.
The second, slower struggle was the recovery itself. Work-from-home and then hybrid work meant the offices did not refill on any predictable schedule, and a canteen at 40% footfall is a different, harder business than one at full capacity. The proof is in the revenue line: FY23 operating revenue was ₹41.9 crore — still below the roughly ₹48 crore the company had earned in the year ending March 2020. In other words, HungerBox spent three full years climbing back to where it had been before the pandemic, all while continuing to pay for a platform built for far higher volumes.
The turning point
The turning point is not a single deal — it is the pivot from survival to profitable growth that the asset-light model made possible, and the numbers on either side of it are stark.
On the near-zero side of April 2020, HungerBox had almost no revenue but also, crucially, almost no fixed cost of the kind that sinks a food business: it owned no kitchens, no cold chain, no fleet. Because it aggregated vendors rather than employing them, its cost base flexed downward as orders vanished. The company used the shutdown to build COVID-safe cafeteria tooling — contactless ordering, crowd-flow management using the platform’s data, and hygiene monitoring — and reported signing new clients even through 2020, positioning itself for the reopening rather than only cutting.
On the recovery side, the results compound quickly once footfall returns:
- FY24: revenue jumped 56.8% to about ₹65 crore and the company posted a profit after tax of ₹4.3 crore — up around 175% year on year (Inc42) — its first clearly reported annual profit after the pandemic reset.
- FY25: revenue rose a further 26% to ₹82 crore, EBITDA grew 47% to ₹9.2 crore, order volume rose 27% to 14 crore orders, and gross transaction value climbed 33% to ₹885.9 crore (Entrackr).
The lesson of the turning point is that the same feature that made the crash so total — total dependence on office footfall — was paired with an asset-light structure that made the recovery cheap. A company that had owned the kitchens would likely not have survived a month of April 2020.
The money behind it
HungerBox has never been a heavily funded company by late-decade standards, and its raising largely predates the pandemic.
- Series A (2018): about $4.5 million led by Sabre Partners and South Korea’s Neoplux, with participation from LionRock Capital and Infosys co-founder Kris Gopalakrishnan (TechCrunch; YourStory).
- 2019 — Paytm enters: One97 Communications (Paytm) invested in HungerBox in August 2019, backing it as a strategic corporate-payments play (Inc42; YourStory).
- Series C (December 2019): about $12 million led by Paytm and Asian VC fund NPTK, with existing backers Sabre Partners and Neoplux participating; this took the company’s disclosed total to roughly $16.5 million at the time (TechCrunch; nuffoodsspectrum).
- Total raised to date: around $32 million by Entrackr’s 2025 count, and about $34.9 million per Tracxn, across nine to ten rounds and roughly 20 investors — the sources differ, so treat it as a $32–35 million range.
- Ownership and valuation: the two co-founders together held about 17% as of FY25 (Entrackr). HungerBox’s latest valuation has not been publicly disclosed; this piece does not put a number on it.
Named backers — Paytm, Sabre Partners, Neoplux, LionRock Capital and Kris Gopalakrishnan — each mattered in a specific way: Sabre and Neoplux provided the early institutional capital, Paytm brought a payments partner and a strategic corporate distribution angle, and Gopalakrishnan’s involvement lent enterprise-software credibility to a founder pitching India’s largest IT employers.
How it makes money
HungerBox earns a slice of the food that flows through its platform, plus fees for running the operation. The mechanics:
- Commission on transactions: the core line is a fee taken on the value of food ordered through the platform. Against FY25 GTV of ₹885.9 crore, operating revenue of ₹82 crore implies an effective take of roughly 9% — the company keeps a small fraction of every rupee of food it moves.
- Management and technology fees: employers pay for the managed-cafeteria service and the software layer — ordering, analytics, subsidy administration and food-safety compliance.
- Asset-light cost base: because HungerBox does not own kitchens or employ the cooks, its costs are dominated by technology, on-site operations staff and platform overhead rather than food inputs — which is why a ₹82 crore-revenue business can run EBITDA-positive at ₹9.2 crore.
- The part people get wrong: the headline number people quote is GTV (₹885.9 crore), which is the total value of meals sold, not HungerBox’s income. Actual revenue is a single-digit-percent take on that flow, so the business only works at very high order volume — 14 crore orders in FY25 — and with the operating discipline to keep each order cheap to serve.
The numbers
HungerBox’s reported financials tell the crash-and-recovery story cleanly. Unit: ₹ crore. Figures are from MCA filings as compiled by Entrackr and Inc42; the pre-pandemic ₹48 crore mark is from Forbes India reporting for the year ended March 2020.
| Metric (₹ crore) | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 |
| Operating revenue | 41.9 | 65–65.8 | 82 |
| Profit / (loss) after tax | ~1.6 (implied) | 4.3 | Not yet disclosed |
| EBITDA | — | ~6.0–6.24 | 9.2 |
| Gross transaction value | — | 663.3 | 885.9 |
| Order volume (crore) | — | 11 | 14 |
A few reference points around the table:
- Revenue trajectory: about ₹9.6 crore in 2018, roughly ₹48 crore for the year to March 2020, then ₹41.9 crore in FY23 — the dip below the FY20 level is the pandemic scar (Forbes India; Inc42).
- Growth on recovery: +56.8% revenue in FY24 and +26% in FY25, with EBITDA up 47% in FY25 — growth slowing but profitability improving (Entrackr).
- FY24 profit: PAT of ₹4.3 crore, described by Inc42 as up about 175% year on year, which implies an FY23 PAT near ₹1.6 crore — small, and stated here as an implication of the reported growth rate rather than a separately confirmed figure.
- FY26 guidance: management has targeted more than ₹1,200 crore in GTV for FY26, up from ₹885.9 crore in FY25 (Entrackr).
Where the money comes from
The revenue mix is narrower than most food-tech names, and that concentration is the surprise.
- By customer type: the money comes overwhelmingly from large corporate cafeterias — office campuses of big employers — rather than from a spread of small clients. The reported client base of about 176 accounts includes seven of India’s top 10 IT services firms.
- Sector concentration: because IT and IT-enabled services dominate India’s large-campus office market, HungerBox’s fortunes are tied unusually tightly to that one sector’s headcount and its office-attendance policy.
- Geography: operations span roughly 23 cities, but volume clusters in the big technology-employment hubs where large campuses exist — the same cities that emptied fastest in 2020.
- The surprise: for a company that talks about ₹885.9 crore of GTV and 180 million meals, the actual revenue it keeps is modest (₹82 crore) and depends on a relatively small number of very large clients returning to their desks. The scale is real; the take on it is thin and concentrated.
The risks
- Return-to-office dependence. HungerBox’s revenue is a direct function of how many people physically eat in offices. Hybrid and work-from-home structurally lower cafeteria footfall, and April 2020 is the documented worst case, not a hypothetical: orders went to almost nil when buildings closed. Any future shift back toward remote work hits the top line immediately.
- Client and sector concentration. Leaning on large IT employers means an IT-sector hiring freeze, campus consolidation or a single big-client loss can move the numbers hard. Concentration that helps sales efficiency also raises the damage from any one account leaving.
- Thin, volume-dependent economics. With an effective take of roughly 9% on GTV and low-value individual orders, margins depend on very high volumes and tight per-order costs. A squeeze on commissions, or employers cutting food subsidies in a downturn, feeds straight through to a slim profit line (₹4.3 crore PAT on ₹65 crore revenue in FY24).
- Competition and insourcing. The corporate-food space includes established facilities and catering giants, other B2B food-tech players and, always, the option for a large employer to run its cafeteria in-house. HungerBox must keep proving that its software and data layer is worth outsourcing for.
The takeaway
The transferable lesson from HungerBox is that the shape of your cost base decides whether a demand shock is a bad quarter or a funeral. HungerBox had the most concentrated demand risk imaginable — a business that existed only inside offices, in a year the offices closed — and it still lived, because it had deliberately chosen not to own the kitchens, the food or the staff that would have turned zero revenue into ruinous fixed losses. The asset-light decision made in 2016 looked like a modest, unglamorous choice in the good years; in April 2020 it was the difference between surviving and not. When the offices refilled, that same lightness let the company convert recovery into profit within a couple of years. For founders, the point is not to avoid concentrated bets, but to pair a concentrated bet on demand with a cost structure that can shrink to nothing and expand again cheaply.
Frequently asked questions
Who founded HungerBox and when?
HungerBox was co-founded by Sandipan Mitra and Uttam Kumar; the brand launched in August 2016, while the legal entity, Eatgood Technologies Private Limited, was incorporated in 2015. Mitra had earlier built an online food-ordering business that was absorbed into JustEat and then Foodpanda in India.
What does HungerBox actually do?
It is a B2B institutional food-tech platform that digitises corporate and campus cafeterias. Employers use it to run and measure their canteens, employees use its app and QR ordering to buy food without queues, and food vendors use its software to manage orders and payments. HungerBox is asset-light and does not own the kitchens.
How much revenue and profit does HungerBox make?
Operating revenue was ₹82 crore in FY25, up 26% from ₹65 crore in FY24, with FY25 EBITDA of ₹9.2 crore. In FY24 it posted a profit after tax of ₹4.3 crore. Gross transaction value — the total value of food sold through the platform — was ₹885.9 crore in FY25 (Entrackr).
How did COVID-19 affect HungerBox?
Severely. Daily orders fell from a February 2020 peak of about 6.1 lakh to almost nil in April 2020, recovering to only around 25% of pre-COVID levels by October 2020. Revenue took years to recover: FY23’s ₹41.9 crore was still below the roughly ₹48 crore the company earned in the year to March 2020.
Is HungerBox planning an IPO?
As of 2025, management had indicated it may pursue capital-market participation within 12 to 18 months as it strengthens its financials, but HungerBox remains a private company and no listing has been confirmed (Entrackr).
Sources
Figures are as of September 2026. Currency converted at $1 ≈ ₹96.0 as of 18 September 2026 (Trading Economics).
- Entrackr — “HungerBox posts Rs 82 Cr revenue in FY25” (2025): FY25/FY24 revenue, GTV, order volume, EBITDA, total funding, founder ownership, FY26 GTV target and capital-market commentary.
- Inc42 — HungerBox company, funding and financials profiles (2025–2026): FY23 and FY24 revenue, FY24 PAT of ₹4.3 crore and its year-on-year growth; Paytm investment (August 2019).
- Forbes India — “HungerBox: Famished for growth” (2020): founding story, asset-light model, February 2020 peak of 6.1 lakh orders/day, March–October 2020 collapse, 2018 and March-2020 revenue, client and city counts.
- TechCrunch — “Indian B2B food tech startup HungerBox raises $12M from Paytm and others” (December 2019): Series C details and running total.
- YourStory; nuffoodsspectrum — funding rounds, Series A backers (Sabre Partners, Neoplux, LionRock Capital, Kris Gopalakrishnan), 2019 Paytm round.
- Tracxn; PitchBook; Crunchbase — total funding range ($32–35 million), investor list, client/cafeteria/city counts and meals served.
- Ministry of Corporate Affairs data via ZaubaCorp — Eatgood Technologies Private Limited, CIN U74900KA2015PTC080961, RoC Bangalore, incorporation.
Found an error? Write to us and we’ll correct it in the open, dated, on the piece.