In FY25, Snitch’s own regulatory filings show a company that spent roughly ₹1.02 to earn every ₹1 of revenue — a hair’s width from breakeven — even as its founder told reporters the same year that EBITDA had jumped fivefold. Four years earlier, the company barely existed online at all: its wholesale clothing business had collapsed in a pandemic lockdown, and it was clearing dead stock through a bare-bones website built with a four-person team and about 35 products.
That contradiction — a founder-narrated growth story running slightly ahead of what the audited numbers say — sits at the centre of how Snitch, the Bengaluru fast-fashion menswear brand founded by Siddharth Dungarwal, went from a shuttered B2B shirt-maker to a company valued at roughly ₹2,500 crore in five years. This piece works through what is verifiable in that story: the pivot, the Shark Tank India moment that made it famous, the funding, the audited profit-and-loss numbers, and where the business is genuinely exposed.
Quick facts
| Company | Snitch (Snitch Apparels Private Limited) |
| Founded | 2019, as a B2B wholesale apparel label; relaunched direct-to-consumer in July 2020 |
| Founder(s) | Siddharth Dungarwal |
| Businesses | Fast-fashion menswear — shirts, apparel, footwear, accessories — sold via its own app and website, 131 own-and-franchise stores, and marketplaces such as Myntra and Ajio |
| Latest FY revenue (audited) | ₹505.75 crore, FY25 |
| Latest FY profit/loss (audited) | Near-breakeven, roughly -1% EBITDA margin, FY25 (down from a ₹4 crore profit in FY24) |
| Listed | Private |
| Market value / last valuation | ₹2,500 crore (~$260 million), Series B, June 2025 |
| Key shareholders / CEO | Siddharth Dungarwal (Founder and CEO); investors include 360 ONE Asset Management, SWC Global, IvyCap Ventures, and Vedant Fashions founder Ravi Modi |
What they do
Snitch sells trend-led, low-to-mid priced western wear for men — shirts, T-shirts, jackets, co-ord sets, sweaters, innerwear, footwear, perfumes and accessories — to a customer base skewed toward 18 to 30-year-olds in Indian cities who want to look current without paying international fast-fashion prices. The catalogue runs into more than 5,000 SKUs and the brand adds more than fifty new styles every month, according to a report on its design process. It reaches customers through its own app and website, through 131 company-run and franchised stores spread across India as of August 2026, and through marketplaces Myntra and Ajio. As of April 2026, the company said online sales made up around 60% of revenue and offline stores the remaining 40%, with a quick-commerce pilot launched in Bengaluru in October 2025 contributing about a tenth of online sales.
The origin
Siddharth Dungarwal’s route into fashion did not start with Snitch. His father ran Mr & Mr, a B2B shirt-manufacturing business, and Siddharth opened his own small clothing shop, a roughly 400 sq ft store called 4Ever in Bengaluru’s Frazer Town, at around 18 years of age. Between 2012 and 2019 he ran a buying house — the middleman layer between fabric suppliers and large retail brands — manufacturing garments for names including Arvind Fashions, Madura Fashion & Lifestyle and V-Mart. That work taught him sourcing, factory relationships and the economics of wholesale apparel from the inside, but also its ceiling: thin margins, no control over the brand, and revenue entirely dependent on which retailers chose to place orders that season. Snitch itself was launched in 2019 on the same B2B logic — manufacturing fashion-forward menswear and selling it wholesale — before the business model that built it very nearly broke it.
The struggle years
Two moments in Dungarwal’s run as an apparel entrepreneur read less like setbacks and more like near-misses. In 2012, while running his buying house, a buyer backed out of a deal and left him holding around ₹25 lakh of unsold fabric — enough to force a pivot into manufacturing T-shirts just to recover some value from the inventory. It worked, narrowly, and became the template he would fall back on eight years later.
The bigger crisis arrived with COVID-19 in 2020. Snitch’s B2B wholesale channel, barely a year old, collapsed as retail partners shut their stores during the lockdowns; there was no wholesale buyer left to sell to. Rather than wait for offline retail to reopen, Dungarwal turned the unsold B2B stock into a direct-to-consumer experiment, launching a bare website in July 2020 with about 35 SKUs and a four-person team. It was meant to clear inventory, not build a company. That it did not stay a clearance sale is the entire second act of this story.
The turning point
The moment Snitch stopped being a Bengaluru D2C label and became a nationally recognised brand was its appearance on Shark Tank India Season 2, which aired in January 2023. Dungarwal walked into the pitch with a business already doing about ₹11 crore in monthly net revenue, and walked out with a deal from all five sharks on the panel — Aman Gupta (boAt), Namita Thapar (Emcure Pharmaceuticals), Anupam Mittal (Shaadi.com), Vineeta Singh (SUGAR Cosmetics) and Peyush Bansal (Lenskart) — who together put in ₹1.5 crore for 1.5% equity, implying a ₹100 crore valuation for a brand that was barely two and a half years past its D2C relaunch.
The before-and-after numbers make the size of that inflection clear. In FY23, the year of the pitch, Snitch’s revenue was ₹120 crore, itself up 250% from ₹44 crore in FY22. The year after the episode aired, FY24 revenue jumped again to ₹241 crore — roughly 2.3 times FY23 — while the company also turned a profit of about ₹4 crore that year, according to the numbers later reported from its financial filings. Getting all five sharks on television did not by itself cause that growth, but it is the single event that turned a founder’s Instagram following into national press coverage, wholesale investor interest, and the funding rounds that followed within a year.
The money behind it
Snitch stayed bootstrapped until early 2023. The Shark Tank India cheque of ₹1.5 crore in January 2023 was followed by a proper institutional round: a ₹110 crore (about $13 million) Series A in December 2023, co-led by IvyCap Ventures and SWC Global, at a reported valuation of around ₹500 crore. IvyCap and SWC’s money went into technology, senior hires and the first serious push into offline retail — the store count started climbing meaningfully only after this round closed.
The bigger jump came in June 2025, when Snitch closed a ₹340 crore round — ₹280 crore of primary capital led by 360 ONE Asset Management, plus about ₹60 crore of secondary shares picked up by Vedant Fashions (Manyavar) founder Ravi Modi, with existing investors SWC Global and IvyCap Ventures each adding roughly ₹29.4 crore ($3.5 million). That round valued Snitch at approximately ₹2,500 crore (~$260 million), close to a fivefold jump from the Series A mark eighteen months earlier. The 360 ONE money is earmarked for faster store rollout — Snitch had crossed 131 stores by August 2026 — and a pilot international launch in West Asia. Reported totals for money raised across all rounds vary depending on what is counted: Entrackr’s tally of the primary institutional rounds puts it near $46 million, while Inc42 has cited a cumulative figure of $53.5 million once secondary transactions and top-ups are folded in. Both figures exclude the original Shark Tank cheque.
How it makes money
Snitch’s model is closer to Zara’s than to a typical Indian D2C label: it designs, orders in small batches from job-work factories around Bengaluru and Tirupur that will accept short production runs, and treats the first units of any new style as a live test rather than a finished commitment. A style that sells is scaled into a bigger production run within a matter of weeks; one that does not is retired before it becomes dead stock. The brand says it can move from concept to shelf in a few weeks and sometimes days, against an industry norm closer to six to eight months, and uses online sales and social data to flag which colours, cuts and categories to chase next. Because Snitch owns the brand and the design rather than manufacturing for someone else, it earns full retail margin on what sells rather than a wholesale cut — but it also carries all the demand-forecasting risk that used to sit with the retailers it once supplied.
The part outsiders tend to get wrong is assuming that a business built on speed and virality scales its profit at the same rate as its revenue. It does not, at least not yet. FY25’s numbers show employee costs rising 3.7 times year-on-year to about ₹65 crore and advertising and marketing spend rising 2.3 times to about ₹83 crore — both growing faster than the roughly 2 times revenue growth they were meant to fund. That is the arithmetic behind a company that doubled its top line and still ended the year near breakeven rather than meaningfully more profitable.
The numbers
Figures below are drawn from Snitch’s own financial filings as reported by business publications tracking its Registrar of Companies disclosures, except FY26, which is a company-stated, unaudited figure and is marked as such. Amounts are in ₹ crore.
| Financial year | Revenue (₹ crore) | Profit / loss (₹ crore) |
| FY23 | 120 | Not disclosed |
| FY24 | 241 | Profit of about 4 |
| FY25 (audited) | 505.75 (₹498 crore operating sales plus ₹7.5 crore other income) | Near-breakeven; roughly -1% EBITDA margin |
| FY26 (company-stated, unaudited) | 900 | EBITDA margin of about 2-3% (₹18-27 crore) |
The gap between the RoC-sourced FY25 figures and the founder’s own public comments the same year — an EBITDA jump of five times was cited in press coverage around the same period — is the clearest instance of the audited-versus-company-claim gap this piece opened with. Both numbers cannot describe the same twelve months without a very different definition of profitability being used somewhere. Readers should treat the RoC-filed figures as the more reliable read and company-stated FY26 numbers as provisional until they are confirmed in filings.
Where the money comes from
In FY25, roughly 65% of Snitch’s revenue came from online channels — its own app and website plus marketplaces — and about 35% from its then-smaller store network. By April 2026, on the company’s own account, that split had moved to closer to 60% online and 40% offline, with offline sales growing at nearly 75% year-on-year, almost matching the pace of the overall business. For a brand that built its name as a digital-native, Shark-Tank-era D2C story, physical retail closing in on half of revenue within about a year is the surprise: Snitch is increasingly a store business wearing a D2C brand’s reputation. Of its 131 stores, about 60% are franchise-operated and 40% run directly by the company, a split that lets it expand into smaller cities — Kolkata, Nashik, Patiala and Noida all got their first Snitch stores in a single week in August 2026 — without funding every square foot itself.
The risks
The clearest risk is the one sitting in Snitch’s own FY25 numbers: costs are growing faster than revenue. Employee expenses rose 3.7 times and marketing spend 2.3 times in a year when revenue roughly doubled, and the company ended that year at close to breakeven rather than more profitable than the year before. If store count triples toward the roughly 300-location target management has spoken about, without a matching deceleration in per-store and per-employee cost growth, the same arithmetic could turn small losses into larger ones.
Second is competitive pressure from both directions. Global fast-fashion chains such as Zara, H&M and Marks & Spencer already sell a similar western-wear wardrobe to the same urban Indian shopper with deeper balance sheets and established supply chains, while homegrown D2C menswear labels including Bonkers Corner, The Bear House and The Souled Store are chasing the identical 18-to-30 male customer with comparable drop-based marketing.
Third is execution risk from the pace of the offline rollout itself. Going from roughly 50 stores to more than 130 in under two years, with 60% of those run by franchise partners, means Snitch is simultaneously managing real-estate selection, franchisee quality and a fast-fashion supply chain built for rapid reorder cycles — three operationally difficult things being scaled at once. Apparel and accessories remain the company’s sole disclosed revenue stream, so a miss on a season’s trend calls has nowhere else in the business to be absorbed.
The takeaway
The lesson in Snitch’s numbers is not “move fast and drop weekly” — plenty of fast-fashion labels do that and stay unprofitable for a decade. It is that speed only compounds into a business, rather than just a following, if the cost of that speed is tracked as carefully as the sales it produces. Clearing a rack of 35 unsold B2B shirts through a bare website in July 2020 proved there was demand for what Dungarwal was making. Turning that instinct into a 131-store, ₹500 crore-plus-revenue company with audited filings that show costs occasionally outrunning growth is a discipline problem, not a design problem — and it is the one Snitch has not yet fully solved.
Frequently asked questions
Who founded Snitch, and when?
Snitch was founded by Siddharth Dungarwal in 2019 as a B2B wholesale apparel label. It relaunched as a direct-to-consumer brand in July 2020 after the pandemic collapsed its wholesale business.
Is Snitch a unicorn?
No. Its most recent funding round, in June 2025, valued the company at approximately ₹2,500 crore, or roughly $260 million at current exchange rates — well below the $1 billion mark that defines unicorn status, despite some media reports describing it that way.
Is Snitch profitable?
It has been inconsistently profitable. Financial filings reported by business media show a roughly ₹4 crore profit in FY24 followed by a near-breakeven FY25, with costs such as marketing and employee expenses growing faster than revenue that year. The company has separately claimed a stronger FY26 performance, which is unaudited at the time of writing.
How does Snitch’s fast-fashion model work?
Snitch designs small pilot batches, lists them online, and uses sales data to decide within weeks whether to scale a style into a larger production run through small job-work factories or drop it. The company says this cuts its concept-to-shelf timeline to a few weeks, against an industry norm of six to eight months.
Is Snitch preparing for an IPO?
The company’s founder has spoken publicly about an IPO as a multi-year goal, alongside international expansion starting with a West Asia pilot. No listing timeline has been confirmed through a regulatory filing as of this piece’s research.
Sources
Figures are as of September 2026. Currency converted at $1 ≈ ₹96.0 as of 18 September 2026 (Trading Economics).
- Entrackr, “Snitch nears Rs 500 Cr revenue in FY25, stays close to breakeven,” January 2026
- Entrackr, “Snitch to raise Rs 280 Cr in Series B round at Rs 2,500 Cr valuation,” May 2025
- Inc42, “How Snitch Stitched An INR 500 Cr Revenue Run In 5 Years,” June 2025
- Apparel Resources, “Snitch Reports 80% Revenue Growth to US $90 million in FY ’26,” April 2026
- Apparel Resources, “SNITCH Opens Five New Stores, Store Count Reaches 131,” August 2026
- APN News, “Snitch Records a staggering 250 Percent growth in Revenue from 44 crores to 120 Crores in FY 22-23,” May 2023
- The Textile AI, “How D2C Menswear Brands Like Snitch Are Using AI To Launch 50 Styles A Month,” April 2026
- Outlook Business, “Snitch Raises Rs 340 Cr Funding, Valuation Jumps to Rs 2,500 Crore to Fuel Expansion,” June 2025
- IndianWeb2.com, “Bootstrapped Fashion Brand ‘Snitch’ Seized All Five Shark Deal of INR 15 Million for 1.5% Equity,” January 2023
- Revelio Labs, Snitch Apparels employee headcount data, accessed September 2026
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