Startup Deep Dive : Burger Singh — how a masala burger chain cut its FY25 loss to Rs 3.9 crore

Burger Singh sells masala burgers from a menu that starts near ₹99, and in FY25 it did something a fast-food chain rarely does in the same breath: it grew revenue past ₹119 crore while shrinking a loss that had blown out only a year earlier. In FY24 the company’s net loss had jumped more than six-fold to ₹27.9 crore; in FY25 that loss fell to ₹3.9 crore even as revenue climbed roughly 50%.

The contradiction sits at the centre of this story. Here is a brand that was profitable at store level within its first year in 2015, then burned cash chasing scale, then pulled the loss back to near break-even while opening stores faster than before. Kabir Jeet Singh, the founder who got his nickname flipping burgers in a British pub, is now trying to turn a Gurugram delivery kitchen into what the company calls India’s largest franchise-first quick-service platform. This deep dive works through the numbers behind that claim and the places where it could still fall apart.

Quick facts

What they do

Burger Singh runs an Indian-flavour burger chain. It sells burgers built around local spice profiles, alongside sides, beverages and desserts, through a mix of company-owned outlets and franchise stores, and across aggregator apps such as Swiggy and Zomato as well as its own channels. The pitch is that a Western format tastes better to Indian palates when it carries dry masalas and regional flavours; menu items have long leaned into that idea with names like “United States of Punjab” and “Bihari Gosht.” The company operates under Tipping Mr Pink Private Limited, which also holds a casual-dining brand, Glassy, and a Pan-Asian brand, King Hung Dong, though Burger Singh is the revenue engine.

The origin

Kabir Jeet Singh grew up in an army family and studied at Army Public School, Dagshai. After a BBA in Chandigarh he went to the United Kingdom for an MBA at the University of Birmingham, and to fund himself he worked part-time at a burger outlet. Customers started calling the Sikh man behind the counter “Burger Singh.” He carried the nickname, and the conviction that burgers needed Indian spicing to win here, back to India.

He opened the first outlet on 1 November 2014 in Gurugram with about ₹15 lakh in capital. It was tiny: a 98 sq ft counter at Suncity Business Tower on Golf Course Road, three employees, no dine-in seating, built entirely for delivery. His childhood friend Nitin Rana, a Pizza Hut operations veteran since 2003, came on as co-founder and turned the recipe idea into a repeatable kitchen. The bet was narrow and specific: masala burgers, delivered, at prices Indian customers would pay without thinking of it as a treat.

The struggle years

The early signal was good, then the ground shifted. Within six months three more Gurugram stores opened, and by September 2015 the founders said every outlet was profitable, with first-year revenue around ₹3 to ₹4 crore. Then two structural shocks landed.

The first was the rise of food aggregators. When Swiggy and Zomato scaled from 2017, delivery stopped being a moat. Burger Singh had built its edge on running its own delivery from small kitchens; once any restaurant could reach any customer through an app, that edge thinned, and the aggregators began taking a cut of every order. The second was a format mistake. A 2018 push into dine-in did not work, and the company had to walk it back and recommit to a lean quick-service and franchise model. COVID-19 then stalled the rollout in 2020 just as the company was trying to expand on outside capital. Revenue that had reached about ₹21 crore in FY21 had to be rebuilt store by store through the pandemic. None of this was a clean climb; it was a delivery-first idea repeatedly forced to redefine what it was.

The turning point

The clearest inflection is visible in the last two audited years. FY24 was the near-death scare on paper: revenue from operations grew a healthy 34% to ₹77.7 crore, but the net loss surged about 6.3 times, from ₹4.4 crore in FY23 to ₹27.9 crore, because total costs rose faster than sales as the company spent to add stores and infrastructure. A chain that had been proud of unit economics suddenly looked like it was buying growth.

FY25 answered that. Revenue rose to ₹119.9 crore, up about 50% year on year, while the net loss narrowed to ₹3.9 crore and the net margin came in around minus 3.2%. In one year the company went from losing nearly ₹28 crore to losing under ₹4 crore, without slowing store openings. That swing, from a six-fold blow-out to near break-even, is the event that let it raise a priced Series B in March 2026 and start describing itself as a scalable franchise platform rather than a plucky burger brand.

The money behind it

Funding came in small, staggered cheques over a decade rather than one blockbuster round:

• Early rounds: about ₹7.5 crore raised across two rounds between October 2015 and December 2016, with Rukam Capital among the long-running backers.
• November 2019: an extended Series A led by Singapore-based RB Investments (amount undisclosed); the company was reported to have raised roughly $6 million to that point.
• 2022: about ₹30 crore reported from a group including Negen Capital, Rohit Khattar, RB Investments and Rukam Capital.
• December 2023: a pre-Series B that valued the company at about $52 million, led by Turner Morrison, with participation from Homage Ventures, the investment office linked to former IndiGo and OYO executive Aditya Ghosh.
• 18 March 2026: a ₹82 crore Series B led by Artal Asia, with Negen Undiscovered Value Fund and Aurum Rising India Fund, at a reported valuation of ₹520 crore (about $54 million).

Total capital raised is reported at about $29.6 million across roughly 14 rounds (Tracxn), a modest figure for a chain of this store count. What each backer changed is worth naming: RB Investments brought Singapore capital and a delivery-era vote of confidence in 2019; the 2023 Turner Morrison and Homage Ventures round put an experienced operator’s office on the cap table; and the 2026 Artal Asia round is explicitly framed to fund systems, supply chain and training so the franchise model can scale.

How it makes money

Burger Singh earns from two connected engines, and the mix is the whole strategy:

• Company-owned stores: direct food-and-beverage sales. In FY24, sales from its own stores contributed about 48% of operating revenue and grew roughly 60% to ₹37.66 crore.
• Franchise network: franchise fees, royalties and margin on supplies sold into franchise outlets. More than 60% of the network is franchise-owned, which lets the brand add stores with franchisee capital rather than its own.
• Aggregator and own-app orders: a large share of sales flows through Swiggy and Zomato, which charge commissions, plus direct online ordering that avoids that cut.

The part people get wrong is where the money is meant to come from at scale. A franchise-first model is not primarily a food business; it is a systems business. The company makes money when franchisees make money, so its margin depends on operating manuals, supply-chain integration, store-design standards and training holding up across hundreds of outlets run by other people. To lower the entry barrier, the company has used a co-investment structure in which it puts in about ₹20 lakh and the franchisee about ₹25 lakh per store. The biggest cost is food procurement: in FY24 it was the largest single cost centre at about 43% of total costs, rising 31.3% to ₹39.2 crore.

The numbers

Three audited years show the shape clearly: fast top-line growth, a sharp loss spike in FY24, and a near-return to break-even in FY25.

Figures are revenue from operations, per Entrackr (FY23, FY24) and Inc42 (FY25); FY25 net loss and margin are per Inc42. Supporting detail:

• FY24 EBITDA was estimated at about minus ₹24.6 crore, reflecting the cost of the expansion push.
• FY25 total expenses were about ₹123.7 crore against revenue of ₹119.9 crore, which is why the loss narrowed to ₹3.9 crore rather than vanishing.
• FY24 cash and bank balances stood at about ₹19.51 crore, with total current assets of about ₹31.3 crore; FY25 total assets were about ₹71.3 crore.
• Longer view: revenue was about ₹21 crore in FY21, so the FY25 figure is roughly a six-fold rise across four years.

Where the money comes from

The revenue base is split across ownership model, channel and geography:

• By ownership: in FY24 company-owned stores drove about 48% of operating revenue (₹37.66 crore), with the balance from the franchise network and supply margin.
• By channel: a meaningful chunk of orders comes through Swiggy and Zomato, which is both the reach and the cost, alongside dine-in and own-app orders.
• By geography: Delhi-NCR has long been the anchor region, but the growth plan is deliberately tilted toward smaller cities. As of the March 2026 round the chain had crossed 200 stores, and by other 2026 reports had spread to more than 80 cities.

The surprise is the direction of travel. Rather than fighting McDonald’s and Burger King for metro high streets, Burger Singh is betting on tier-2 and tier-3 towns, with stated targets of around 300 stores in early 2026 and more than 750 by 2028, plus international outlets including the United Kingdom. The economics only work if small-town franchise stores can hit the same discipline as the flagship company outlets.

The risks

• Aggregator dependence and commissions. A large share of orders runs through Swiggy and Zomato, which take a cut of each order and control the customer relationship. If commissions rise or ranking algorithms shift, a delivery-heavy chain feels it directly in margin, exactly the pressure that erased its original delivery moat after 2017.
• Franchise-model execution. More than 60% franchise ownership means quality, food safety and unit economics depend on hundreds of independent operators following the system. One region of weak franchisees can dent the brand and the royalty base at once; scaling to 750 stores multiplies that exposure. The FY24 loss spike shows how fast costs can outrun revenue when a chain pushes expansion.
• Thin cushion and competition. FY25 was still a loss year, with expenses of about ₹123.7 crore just ahead of revenue, so the company is near break-even rather than comfortably past it. It competes with far larger, better-capitalised burger chains and with a crowded field of Indian QSR brands, any of which can undercut on price or outspend on marketing.

The takeaway

The transferable lesson is about what a moat actually is. Burger Singh’s first advantage, running its own delivery, was real until platforms made delivery a commodity, and the company nearly lost its identity chasing formats that did not fit. What it rebuilt was harder to copy: a franchise system with standard recipes, supply chains and training that lets someone else’s capital open the next store. The FY24-to-FY25 swing, from a ₹27.9 crore loss to a ₹3.9 crore loss without slowing growth, is the proof point that the system, not the sauce, is now the business. For any founder, the signal is that when your first edge is competed away, the durable move is to turn the thing you do well into a repeatable system other people will pay to run.

Frequently asked questions

Who owns Burger Singh?

Burger Singh is operated by Tipping Mr Pink Private Limited, co-founded by Kabir Jeet Singh and Nitin Rana. Kabir Jeet Singh is the founder and chief executive. The company is privately held, with backers including Artal Asia, Rukam Capital, RB Investments, Turner Morrison and Homage Ventures.

How much revenue does Burger Singh make?

For FY25 (year ended 31 March 2025), Burger Singh reported revenue of about ₹119.9 crore, up roughly 50% year on year, per Inc42; the company itself cited about ₹117 crore. That follows ₹77.7 crore in FY24 and ₹57.8 crore in FY23.

Is Burger Singh profitable?

Not yet, but it is close. In FY25 it reported a net loss of about ₹3.9 crore, sharply lower than the ₹27.9 crore loss in FY24, with a net margin around minus 3.2%. Its individual outlets have been described as profitable at store level since its early years.

What is Burger Singh’s latest valuation?

Its March 2026 Series B of ₹82 crore, led by Artal Asia, was reported at a valuation of about ₹520 crore (roughly $54 million). An earlier pre-Series B in December 2023 valued it at about $52 million.

How many outlets does Burger Singh have?

As of its March 2026 funding round the chain had crossed 200 stores, spread across more than 80 cities by other 2026 reports, with more than 60% franchise-owned. It has stated targets of around 300 stores in early 2026 and over 750 by 2028.

Sources

Figures are as of September 2026. Currency converted at $1 ≈ ₹96.0 as of 18 September 2026 (Trading Economics).

• Entrackr, “Burger Singh records Rs 78 Cr revenue in FY24, losses surge 6.3X” — November 2024
• Inc42, Burger Singh company financials (FY25 revenue, loss, expenses, assets) — 2026
• Outlook Business, “Burger Singh secures ₹82 crore Series B funding” — March 2026
• Business Standard, “Burger Singh raises ₹82 crore in funding round led by Artal Asia” — March 2026
• Indian Retailer, “Burger Singh secures Rs 82 Cr funding at Rs 520 crore valuation” — March 2026
• Indian Retailer / Medium (Startups Meet), pre-Series B at $52 million valuation, led by Turner Morrison with Homage Ventures — December 2023
• The Weekend Leader, founder profile of Kabir Jeet Singh (founding, first outlet, early revenue, dine-in setback) — profile feature
• thekredible, Burger Singh FY23 financials (revenue and ₹4.4 crore loss) — 2024
• YourStory, Inc42 (buzz) and Inshorts, RB Investments-led round — November 2019
• indiaretailing, Burger Singh small-town expansion and store targets to 2028 — 2026
• Tracxn, Tipping Mr Pink Private Limited company and legal-entity profile (total raised, funding rounds) — 2026

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